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ABSTRACT
In an Industrial Control System (ICS), its complex network of sen-
sors, actuators and controllers have raised security concerns for
critical infrastructures and industrial production units. This opin-
ion paper strives to initiate discussion on the design algorithms
which can segregate attacks from faults.Most of the proposed anom-
aly detection mechanisms are not able to differentiate between an
attack and an anomaly due to a fault. We argue on the need of
solving this important problem form our experiences in CPS se-
curity research. First, we motivate using analysis of studies and in-
terviews though economical and psychological aspects. Thenmain
challenges are highlighted. Further, we proposemultiple directions
of approach with suitable reasoning and examples from ICS sys-
tems.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are found in modern critical in-
frastructure (CI) such as the electric power grid and water treat-
ment plants. The primary role of an ICS is to control the underly-
ing processes in a CI. Such controls are facilitated through the use
of computing and communication elements such as Programmable
Logic Controllers (PLCs) and Supervisory Control and Data Acqui-
sition systems (SCADA), and communications networks. The PLCs
receive data from sensors, compute control actions, and send these
over to the actuators for effecting control over the process. The
SCADA workstations are used to exert high level control over the
PLCs, and the process, and provide a view into the current process
state. Each of these computing elements is vulnerable to cyber and
physical attacks as evident from several widely reported successful
attempts such as those reported in,[10, 12, 22]. Such attacks have
demonstrated that while air-gapping a system might be a means
to consider securing an ICS, it does not guarantee in keeping at-
tackers from gaining access to the system.
Successful attacks on ICS have led to research to prevent, detect,
and react to different forms of cyber attacks. Anomaly detection
that aims at raising an alert when the controlled process in an ICS
moves from its normal to an unexpected, i.e. anomalous, state. The
challenge with the proposed techniques is that those are not able
to distinguish between an anomaly being raised due to an attack
or a system fault.
Figure 1: Traditional responses to anomalies: attacks and
faults
2 PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION
Approaches used in the design of such anomaly detectors fall into
two broad categories: design-centric [3] and data-centric [8]. The fo-
cus of this position paper is on the data-centric approaches that rely
on well-known methods for model creation such as those found in
the system identification [14] and machine learning literature[11].
While the use of machine learning to design anomaly detectors be-
comes attractive with increasing availability of data and advanced
computational resources, recent attempts [3, 4, 16, 20, 21] to create
anomaly detectors, have concluded that the majority of techniques
are not able to distinguish a fault from an attack. This opinion pa-
per focuses on this challenge with the hope that other researchers
will come forward and propose practical solutions to overcome the
discussed challenges.
 Relevance of differentiator and correctness: First, lets in-
vestigate why a robust robust differentiator is important. We in-
terviewed plant operators and cyber-security researchers with fol-
lowing questions, as part of a survey, to begin with:
• Do you havemeasures to identify between attack and fault?
• If you have measures to identify an attack, what is the typi-
cal response to it, i.e., when an alarm is raised for potential
attack what is the system and the operator configured to
do?
• Will the response be different if the algorithm told it was a
system fault?
We interviewed 19 candidates which included researchers at
state-of-art test beds like SWaT [13], EPIC [18] and WADI [7], ex-
perts in ICS security and engineers at industrial production plants
for steel and water. 18 participants said that they have not adopted
any measure so far or have not come across even a near-robust
algorithm to differentiate between the two versions of anomalies.
Based on responses to aforementioned questions, we could con-
firm that both the system’s and the people’s behavior vary a lot
in the contexts of attacks and fault alarms. We sketch the findings
in Fig. 1. A CI plant may go in shutdown for hours under identi-
fication of an attack. A correct classification, an attack identified
as an attack and a fault as a fault would save loss of lives and rev-
enues. But incorrect and cross classifications would be detrimental
for the system. A fault raised as attack has high psychological im-
pacts, invites panic and responses of higher magnitudes. Hence,
if anomaly detectors are deployed, faults in sensors or actuators
might lead to shutdowns of whole units and incur huge economic
losses. Similarly, an attack identified as a fault would undermine
the losses and a repetitions would discourage adoptions of such de-
tectors. We note that psychologically an attack is dealt with much
higher alertness and hardness in response strategy.
Our participants did acknowledge the relevance which can be
inferred from the responses like:
• "Yes, no need to shut the whole system under assumption of
attack when a fault might have occurred".
• "Yes, if an algorithm can identify it to be a system fault imme-
diately, it will reduce the amount of time required during the
identification process. True attacks can be immediately treated
as attacks and response time will be much shorter."
• "Yes, the incidents should be handled differently."
• "... But the incident response may have different outcome if
it isn’t an attack. Such as forensics and developing control to
handle such attacks may not be performed."
Five of the participants reported to be working on response
and mitigation strategy design and did suggest that differentiat-
ing strategy would save time and facilitate narrowing down fo-
cus and search spaces. Participants working in production indus-
tries reported of following traditional methods of predictive main-
tenance in case of anomalies i.e., deviations of variables from his-
tory and process physics Fig. 1. The process still keeps running
in this case. Breakdown maintenance is conducted in case there
are serious faults. In this case either spare parts are used or redun-
dant process chains are activated. It is to be noted that there are
dedicated employees under central maintenance team for handling
such faults which have been maturing over the decades but intel-
ligent cyber attackers might hide their attacks inside such checks.
Also the frequency of faults and predictive maintenance are fairly
high. On the other side, a cyber attack leads to process halt and
shutdowns of plants like in recent case with Renault, [2]. And to
make matter worse, cyber attacks against industrial targets have
been growing rapidly [1] as well. As noted before, any cross-error
would invite economic and opportunity losses. Hence a segrega-
tion is necessary and very timely.
3 WHY IS THE SEGREGATION DIFFICULT?
We and past research works like [3, 4, 6, 9, 16, 20, 21] note that
it is fairly difficult to differentiate between these two vectors of
anomalies. As an example consider Fig. 2 that shows data from
two different pressure sensors from the water distribution testbed.
On the left hand side, a water leakage attack was executed while
on the right hand side a fault similar to leakage happened but for
a statistical detector both appear to be the same. Few of the chal-
lenges are summarized herein:
[h]
Figure 2: It is hard to distinguish between an attack (on the
left) and a fault (on the right) for two different sensors in a
water distribution testbed.
 Challenge 1. Not modeling properties of faults and at-
tacks: Most of the related works would look at the consequences
of an attack or fault rather than looking through the properties
of attack or fault themselves. For example, a fault is usually ran-
dom and results in abrupt change for a short period of time. On
the other hand an attack is properly planed and is executed for a
longer time to do substantial damages. Missing on opportunities
of differential properties adds to hardness of the problem.
 Challenge 2. Unknown attacks and faults: The base as-
sumption for an anomaly detection method is that there would al-
ways be unknown attacks, therefore it is not possible to use black-
listing or white-listing as an effective method [19]. Therefore, we
rely on behavioral methods which simply look at the end result of
anomalous behavior and raise an alarm. The challenge is that it is
not possible to create a model for each possible fault that is out
there in the wild.
 Challenge 3. Lack of hybrid models: There are no precise
hybrid models for cyber and physical domains. It is not clear how
to come up and use the information from independent and orthog-
onal spaces through an analytical lense. Most of the anomaly de-
tection methods are implemented either in cyber layer or in the
physical layer. There is no one size fit all techniques due to a wide
variety of ICS.
4 SUGGESTED DIRECTIONS OF APPROACH
There are a lot of efforts for detecting sensor attacks but most
can not distinguish between an attack and a faulty sensor mea-
surement. An attempt was made recently [15] to model and detect
transient faults. It models a transient fault for each sensor and an
algorithm is designed to detect and identify attacks in the presence
of transient faults. This approach can detect transient faults (e.g., a
GPS reporting faulty readings inside a tunnel) but not the perma-
nent faults/attacks, e.g., DDoS attack or cutting wire of a sensor.
Also, this work does not consider a stealthy attacker trying to imi-
tate a transient fault. They have also assumed multiple sensors for
the same physical state variable. They also assume an abstract sen-
sor model where the sensor reports an interval of readings e.g., a
set rather than one value. Therefore, it is highly desirable to come
up with novel methods which could differentiate between a fault
and an attack by considering a realistic threat model. In the follow-
ing, we present a few proposals that also highlight open problems.
2
4.1 Combining Process and Network Layer
Detectors
The studies involving both the network and the process layer are
rare [11]. We propose to use data from both the network layer and
the process layer. For example, if a sensor data is compromised as
a man in the middle attack (MiTM) [8] then the resultant process
state might have equally resulted from a fault but by looking at the
MiTM traffic, it would be certainly possible to point out an attack.
4.2 Relation Between Size, Detection Time and
Time to Damage of faults and attacks
Fault/Attack size means how much is the sudden change in the
physical state variables. For example, consider an initial state (Si )
before attack and state transition toSa after an attack,where |Sa | >>>
|Si |, such an instantaneous change would be considered of a large
size. Detection time is a measure of how fast one can detect the
attack whereas time to damage depends on the process itself, e.g.,
for a fluid storage tank depending on the capacity it could take
long time to overflow or underflow attack. While in electric grid
a sudden surge can instantly damage the physical system. We can
study relationship between variables to segregate between two.
4.3 Virtual Sensors/Digital Twin
We can exploit the idea of a digital twin or model virtual sensors.
Since the digital system does not have any real sensors, it could
not get faulty and any manipulation must be a result of some at-
tack. The key assumption is that an attacker must attack that vir-
tual/digital twin.
4.4 Signature based Attack Detection
Attack signatures can be collected by designing an attacker’s in-
tentions and strategy. However, a limitation of this method is that
it would not be able to detect unseen attack patterns.
4.5 Mode Shift Across Attack and Fault
The idea is to figure out how the device’s mode transition occurs
during a fault. Faults would be random, for example, failing of a
sensor or actuator. Whereas, attacks would exhibit a mode shift
for several devices at the same time. For example, to attack a pro-
cess plant, an attacker would compromise the sensor as well as
actuator’s mode at the same time to hide itself.
4.6 Simulate Failures and Faults for Known
Device
Attacks are unknown before an attack has taken place whereas
fault data could be generated. The idea is to collect data for the
(known) faulty behavior to create fault models. If we have profiles
for normal data as well as faulty data, then it should be possible to
distinguish attacks from faults.
4.7 Exploiting Asymmetry between
Correlation and Causation
We argue that correlated failures should be taken with a pinch of
salt. If a sensor fails or an actuator fails it would have an impact
on another associated device. For example, if a motorized valve at
the inlet of a tank fails then the flow sensor is also affected but
if the flow sensor fails then the actuator (motorized valve) is not
affected. Therefore, to attack the flow sensor an attacker has to
attack both the flow meter as well as the actuator but there is no
such requirement for a fault.
4.8 Detection Latency based Method
An interesting observation from previous research [5, 15] shows
that sophisticated attacks (takes more time) and fault like bias in-
jection attacks (detected instantaneously) takes different amount
of time. The hypothesis is that the fault would be a sudden change.
However, a persistent attacker would stay for a longer period of
time to do substantial damage.
4.9 Fault Time Constant
Fault’s time constant would be different than that of attack. In-
spired from the research in fault detection in ICS [17], it is hy-
pothesized that the faults are more abrupt and random and hence
their time constant is much smaller than the normal process pro-
file. However, we assume that an attacker would try to imitate as
close to the process as possible, therefore if modeled properly faults
could be distinguished.
4.10 Redundancy
Using the redundant sensors for the same physical state variable
can help in fault and attack isolation provided that not all are at-
tacked at the same time [15].
5 CONCLUSIONS
Through this opinion paper we aim to kindle interest of ICS com-
munity towards deeper nuances of anomaly detection and analysis.
We assert the relevance of differentiating between faults and at-
tacks in cyber-physical systems and try to motivate from both eco-
nomical and psychological lenses which are further corroborated
by interviews with researchers and industry managers. We build
up on top of the core challenges in segregating the two forms of
anomalies and propose multiple directions of approach. This work
shall be followed by rigorous research in most of the outlined di-
rections in collaborations with research institutes and universities
hosting state-of-art CPS test beds.
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